A well-established result in the theoretical literature on labour market flexibility is that the employment should be more volatile in "flexible" labour markets. Over the last 35 years, Italy gives a good example of a transition from an over-regulated labour market into a quite more flexible one. According to the theory, the deregulation is expected to increase the employment variance. Despite the anecdotal evidence reported in the press, the literature hardly finds any evidence for such an effect. This paper exploits time-series of several employment indicators since 1980, allowing us to compare decades with different labour market regulation. All the considered series show evidence of a structural break with an increase in their variance after the deregulation, confirming the expected pattern. This gives some support to the concerns for increased job insecurity.
Introduction
The theoretical literature on the consequences of labour market regulation finds that the main result of job-protection is to smooth the path of the employment over the cycle. In fact, while the impact of jobprotection on the employment level is unclear, 1 its effect on the employment variance is well-known (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Lazear, 1990) .
In 1994 the OECD publications "Employment Outlook" and "The OECD Jobs Study" ranked Italy in the first position according to the main indicators of labour market rigidity, namely employment protection and labour market regulation. After the deregulation started in 1991-92, the updating of these indicators in OECD (2004) indicates a substantially more flexible labour market. The Fraser Institute's economic freedom index for Italy confirms this pattern, being its value 3.7 in 1970, 4.1 in 1980, 4.2 in 1990 and 5.5 in 2004. 2 The aim of this paper is to investigate the effectiveness of the Italian labour market deregulation. This is an important issue because the debate as to whether changes in employment regulation could imply job instability is still controversial. Several authors find that the overall job stability has not decreased in the recent years (see Winkelmann and Zimmermann, 1998; Erlinghagen, 2002; Auer, 2005 ; L'Horty, 2004, among others). To analyse whether flexibility-oriented reforms have changed the behaviour of the Italian labour market, we use some recent developments in time-series analysis. Our approach is based on the idea that more freedom to hire and fire intensifies the responsiveness of the employment to macroeconomic fluctuations by increasing its variance (Bertola, 1990; Abraham and Houseman, 1994) . We search for evidence of this effect in several aggregate employment measures. Then, we check whether changes in the variance correspond to the timing of labour market reforms. This paper presents evidence of the effectiveness of Italian labour market deregulation, with an increase in the variance of employment indicators after the institutional reforms. This outcome is stronger when we isolate the industrial sector. Furthermore, this paper also helps to explain why it is not easy to find any change in the average job tenure or in job stability over the last decade given that institutional differences only emerge when we go back to the 1980s.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the Italian labour market regulation. Section 3 describes the methodology. Section 4 reports our empirical findings, and Section 5 report draws some concluding remarks.
Regulation and deregulation of the Italian labour market
A useful starting point to summarize the history of the Italian labour market regulation is 1962, when severe limitations were introduced for temporary contracts. In 1966 a law prohibited "unfair" dismissals. Since 1969 the main device to adjust the employment was a temporary lay-off (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni, CIG) conceived to accommodate transitory fluctuations in production. In the 70s further controls were established: the most pervasive regulation is law n.300/1970 (Statuto dei Lavoratori) which specified the hiring and firing procedures, the working environment and the workers' mobility inside the firms, the use of overtime, and even wages with respect to the workers' seniority. Moreover, it established the reinstatement obligation 3 for workers subject to unfair dismissals.
In 1974 the appeal procedure for unfair dismissal was made easier, and in 1975, after the oil shocks, wages were indexed to inflation.
In 1984 we observe some attempts of deregulation: the wage indexation was reduced by 15%, and parttime and training contracts (Contratti di Formazione e Lavoro, henceforth CFLs), were introduced. The CFL, conceived as a form of paid apprenticeship, quickly became a way to reduce wages for new hirings. In 1986 a referendum succeeded in further reducing the indexation. In the 1990s, a wave of innovations restructured the labour market. In 1991 a law specified new procedures for collective firing, and it set new limits to the use of the CIG. The following year the wage indexation was definitively abolished. In 1993, the so-called Giugni agreement between unions, industrialists (Confindustria) and the government defined a two-stage wage bargaining: a national-level bargaining to preserve the purchasing power, and a firm-level bargaining to share productivity gains. Remarkably, the 1992-93 reforms were intended to increase wage flexibility, which -as it is well-known-allows to circumvent job protection (Lazear, 1990) . In 1994 the use of the CFL was allowed for a much wider range of situations. Another key innovation was the introduction of the ongoing collaboration contracts in 1995, since these contracts allow total freedom of hiring and firing.
In 1997 the introduction of temporary work agencies broke the monopoly of public employment agencies. In 1998 law n. 196 (the so-called "Pacchetto Treu") introduced new "atypical" contracts, such as the job-sharing and the staff leasing. In 2001 leg. decree 368 made possible the use of fixed-term contracts for subordinate workers as well; then, in 2003, the Biagi law has given the variety of "atypical" labour contracts a common framework. This reform has specified and eased the regulation of the following subjects: staff-leasing, fixed-term contracts, intermittent work, job-sharing, work on project, and occasional work.
Currently, "flexible" work contracts are the overwhelming majority of new hirings (Contini and Trivellato, 2005, chapter IX and the references quoted therein).
Methodology
To study the effectiveness of the Italian labour market deregulation, we analyse the properties of the real GDP (used as a proxy of economic activity) and the main employment indicators. Our approach considers not only changes in the variance, but also in the level and/or the trend. This is necessary because although the final effect of job-protection over the employment level is undetermined, this does not mean that there is no effect (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990) .
The literature provides for several techniques for testing and locating structural breaks in the intercept and trend (see, for example, Perron, 1998, 2003 Wang and Zivot (2000) given that their approach allows to detect multiple structural breaks in the level, trend and variance at the same time, and thus it fits perfectly our needs. 4 Wang and Zivot (2000) consider a segmented deterministically trending and heteroskedastic autoregressive model
for t = 1, 2, ..., T , where u t |Ω t ∼ i.i.d.N (0, 1) and Ω t denotes the information set at time t. It is assumed that the parameters a t , b t and s t are subject to m < T structural changes, m initially known, with break dates
.. < k m ≤ T , so that the observations can be separated into m + 1 regimes. Let k = (k 1 , k 2 , ..., k m ) denote the vector of break dates. For each regime i (i = 1, 2, ..., m + 1), the parameters a t , b t and s t are given by
for k i−1 ≤ t < k i with k 0 = 1 and k m+1 = T + 1. Let I A denote an indicator variable such that I A is equal to one if the event A is true and zero otherwise. Then (1) can be re-written as
or, alternatively, as
where
and B = (α 1 , ..., α m+1 , β 1 , ..., β m+1 , φ 1 , ..., φ p ) 0 . Let σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , ..., σ m+1 ) 0 and define θ = (B 0 , σ 0 , k 0 ) 0 as the vector of unknown parameters of (2), Y 0 as the vector of p initial values of y t , and Y = (y 1 , ..., y T ) 0 as the vector of observed data. Given the normality of the errors u t , the likelihood function of (2) takes the form
where S is a diagonal matrix with (s 1 , ..., s T ) on the diagonal and X is a T × (2m + 2 + p) matrix with t-th row given by x 0 t . The estimation is obtained by using the Gibbs sampler.
Empirical Results
The above-mentioned methodology for detecting structural breaks has been applied to the following seasonally- To determine the number and the type of structural changes, we estimate structural break models with one autoregressive term allowing for breaks in the intercept, trend and variance with m = 1, ..., 4 breaks. Model choice based on minimizing BIC favors the m = 1 over any other model in all cases but the employment in Industry, where two breaks are found. Figure 1 presents the plot of all the series and their corresponding posterior probability of the change point. Table 1 reports the estimates of the parameters for the chosen models and the date with the highest posterior probability. Our indicator for the overall economic variance (the real GDP) shows a structural change in 1990:2, corresponding to an increased variance. 6 We find structural changes in 1992 for the employment index, the civilian employment, employment in Services and the Standard Labour Units.
Years 1991-93 coincide with the start of the second, and most important, wave of labour market deregulation (see section 2). 7 Moreover, employment in Industry shows a structural change in 1985 and another in 1991, with increased variance in each sub-period, even though the variance of the industrial production is constant since 1983. This result is particularly significant: in this series we detect the predicted effect for both waves of institutional reforms even though the variance of the industrial production is unchanged.
Summing up, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that institutional reforms have affected the labour market behaviour by conveying the increased economic fluctuations to the employment. 8 This conclusion is even stronger for the industrial employment, whose variance increases regardless of a constant variance of the production.
Concluding remarks
After 1990 the Italian real GDP has become more volatile with respect to the 1980s, and most of our employment indicators do so after 1992. The two-year lag necessary to observe some effects of the augmented economic volatility on the employment coincide with a turning point in labour market legislation. The dismantling of the wage indexation, the introduction of the so-called Giugni agreement and the start of a deep deregulation for newly hired workers were supposed to affect the transmission of macroeconomic shocks to the employment. Thus, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the employment indicators mirrored the increased macroeconomic variance.
This outcome is even stronger when we isolate the industrial sector, where it is possible to detect an effect of both deregulation waves even though the variance of the production is unchanged. This means that after the reforms we find an increase of the employment variance without any increase of the economic variance.
Our conclusions help to explain why it is difficult to find any change in the average job tenure or in job stability over the last decade: institutional differences only emerge when we go back to the 1980s. From the point of view of this paper, the 1990s are a decade with homogeneous institutions, thus we should not expect striking differences in the labour market behaviour. Our findings give some support to the widespread perception of increased job insecurity reported in the press. Table presents the numerical moments of the parameters referred to the autoregressive term, intercept, trend and variance, and the date with the highest posterior probability (in parenthesis). 
